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ABSTRACT 
This paper draws on insights from a variety of fields, including discursive 
psychology, ethnomethodology, dramatism, rhetoric, ante-narrative analysis and 
conversation analysis, to examine the discursive devices employed in the storytelling 
surrounding the recent financial crisis. Discursive devices refer to the linguistic styles, 
phrases, tropes and figures of speech that, we propose, are central to the development 
of a compelling story. We focus our analysis on the moral stories constructed during a 
public hearing involving senior banking executives in the UK. The analysis suggests 
that two competing story-lines were used by the bankers and their questioners to 
emplot the events preceding the financial crisis. We propose that a discursive devices 
approach contributes to the understanding of storytelling by highlighting the power of 
micro-linguistic tools in laying out the moral landscape of the story. We argue that the 
stories surrounding the financial crisis are important because they shaped how the 
crisis was made sense of and acted upon.  
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“It is a well-known feature of historical inquiries that an event can be 
reconstructed in countless ways.”  
(Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 1) 
 
“Men [sic] seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To 
this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any 
selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of 
reality.”  
(Burke, 1969: 59) 
 
 
Introduction 
The recent financial crisis, according to Colville and Pye (2010: 373), has led to “a 
collapse in collective sensemaking”. During major crises of this kind, taken for 
granted assumptions are suddenly open to question. Financial products and practices 
that were once assumed to be sustainable sources of economic growth and prosperity 
swiftly became de-legitimized, regarded instead as “questionable practices” (Johnson 
& Kwak, 2010: 197) and “bogus” sources of growth (McDonald & Robinson, 2009: 
256). Highly respected individuals and institutions (bankers, regulators) suddenly 
became widely detested. “(T)he ideology of Wall Street – that unfettered innovation 
and unregulated financial markets were good for America and the world” had been 
“the consensus position in Washington” (Johnson & Kwak, 2010: 5) – but seemingly 
no longer. In such periods of grave uncertainty and highly disturbed sensemaking, the 
question of “what is going on?” comes to the forefront: these are situations 
characterised more by ‘vu jade’ (never seen this before) rather than ‘déjà vu’ (Weick, 
1993: 633-4). 
In this paper, we examine the role of storytelling in the process of making 
sense of the financial crisis. We follow Watson’s (2009: 429) definition of stories as 
“temporally sequenced accounts of events which unfold through plots involving the 
interplay of characters with interests, motives, emotions and moralities”. This paper 
focuses specifically on the latter aspect: the way in which stories work to construct the 
morality of the characters involved. We examine the moral stories crafted during a 
public hearing in the UK that was designed to uncover ‘what (or who) went wrong’ 
during the recent financial crisis. We draw upon work in the fields of Discursive 
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Psychology (eg. Edwards & Potter, 1992), ethnomethodology (eg. Lynch & Bogen, 
1996), Conversational Analysis (eg. Antaki & Horowitz, 2000), rhetoric (eg. Billig, 
1996), dramatism (eg. Burke, 1969) and narrative (eg. Boje, 2001) to examine the 
micro-linguistic tools – what we call ‘discursive devices’ (DDs) following Edwards 
and Potter (1992: 68) – used to build different emplotments of the ‘story’ of the 
financial crisis and paint a picture of the key characters, for example as ‘villains’ or 
‘victims’.  
Our approach is both inspired by, and builds upon, the ante-narrative 
perspective (Boje, 2001; 2008; 2010). Ante-narrative offers an alternative to the 
classical understanding of narrative as a “coherent, linear and ordered tale” (Boje, 
2001: 11) told by a single author(ity). Ante-narrative, in contrast, captures the ‘lived 
experience’ of storytelling in organizations where stories often have multiple authors 
(plurivocality), get built up in piecemeal fashion over time, often recounted only in 
fragments, never completely finalised and always open to new ‘twists’ as they are re-
told. Ante-narrative is ‘ante’ in a double sense: both being ‘before’ a coherent and 
complete narrative - before the story is finalised, with a beginning, middle, and end, 
complete with a moral and an agreed plot, and also being about ‘speculation’ - the 
ambiguity of trying to narrate ‘what is happening?’ in the flow of lived experience 
(Boje, 2001: 3-4).  
Our approach to studying story-building through DDs contributes to the 
literature on ante-narrative by revealing the rhetorical processes through which stories 
are constructed in the face of counter-narratives. The lived experience of sensemaking 
within everyday interaction is often characterised by polyphony (Boje, 2001): many 
overlapping, interweaving (and perhaps even competing) narratives rather than a 
single coherent and authoritative storyline (see also HR-2010-0116, this issue). 
Stories, we propose, “are shaped by and for their interactional contingencies” (Stokoe 
& Edwards, 2006: 57) as they respond to the arguments and counter-arguments in 
which they are rhetorically located. Ochs (1997: 185) argues that narratives told in 
conversational situations often involve co-authorship, where others “ask questions, 
comment and otherwise overtly contribute to an evolving tale”. Such “conversational 
storytelling”, as Mandelbaum (1993: 247) calls it, is an interactive arena in which 
contrasting versions of reality can be proposed or inferred from “competing 
interpretations, or competing accounts” (Gabriel, 2000: 49) of “what happened”. For 
Comment [A1]: Please replace with 
author names 
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example, Gabriel (2000: 47-49) describes two rival stories by management and staff 
about the suicide of a restaurant cook and Brown and Humphreys (2003) describe the 
competing stories told by management and staff about an organizational merger. 
Thus, narrators often have to deal with actual or potential counter-narratives which 
question or contradict their version of the story.  
Telling a compelling story in conversational storytelling situations, we 
suggest, requires the “witcraft” (Billig, 1996: 112) to ‘outwit’ actual or potential 
opposing stories. Alternative stories must be discredited or “disqualified” (Antaki & 
Horowitz, 2000: 155) if the preferred story is to be credible. Stories can also ‘build in’ 
devices for handling the potential of being undermined. Stories of paranormal 
encounters, for instance, typically handle the potential of being discredited as wishful 
thinking or attention seeking through avowals of prior scepticism (Lamont, 2007). 
This form of “contrast structure” device (Potter, Stringer & Wetherell, 1984: 88) - “I 
used to think X but now I think Y” - is a common discursive device used to present 
stories as credible by claiming they are counter-dispositional. Our ‘discursive devices 
analysis’ (DDA) approach (Mueller & Whittle, 2011) is valuable, we suggest, because 
it helps us to understand the linguistic methods through which storytellers deal with 
the contestation that occurs when “many different logics for plotting an ongoing event 
are still being investigated” (Boje, 2001: 4). Our approach therefore brings “discursive 
struggle” (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 1) to the forefront of ante-narrative research and 
sheds light on the work involved in making stories plausible in the face of rival 
versions (HR-2010-0116, this issue). 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives some background to 
the stories of the financial crisis. We substantiate our central theoretical perspective 
on moral storytelling and discursive devices in the two sections that follow. The paper 
then moves on to illustrate our argument through analysis of the discursive devices 
extracted from a publicly available transcript
1
 of the UK Treasury Select Committee 
hearing. We frame our analysis in terms of the two differently emplotted story-lines 
narrated by the questioners (MPs) and witnesses (bankers). The final section discusses 
our conclusions and the wider implications of our analysis.  
 
Moral Orders and the Story of the Crisis 
                                                 
1
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/144/09021002.htm 
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Moral plots dominate existing popular accounts of the financial crisis. ‘Insiders’ tell 
tales of immoral characters responsible for the ‘murder’ of respected institutions 
(Tibman, 2009), central characters (such as CEO and President of Lehman Brothers) 
were seen as having “essentially gone mad” (McDonald and Robinson, 2009: 269), 
driving others “quietly nuts” (ibid. 248). The plot-lines of Greek mythology have been 
borrowed to analyse the “Sophoclean tragic hero” involved in the collapse of Bear 
Stearns (Cowan, 2009: 277), the “Delphic” quality of Greenspan (Sorkin, 2009: 62). 
Lehman Brothers was seen as “more a story of hybris than a tragedy” (Ward, 2010: 
227). Stories from Roman times were also borrowed by key actors at the time: the 
resignation of Pettit, then President of Lehman Brothers, was referred to as the “ides 
of March” to refer to the day, “15th March, the day Julius Caesar was killed by his 
former friends in 44 B.C.” (Ward, 2010: 5). The UK Treasury Select Committee 
hearings that we analyse here have been likened to the ‘catharsis’ that Aristotle 
described as an effect of tragic drama on its audience (CRESC, 2009: 19; see also 
Booker, 2004: 607).  
Stories about failure are often constructed in very different ways to stories about 
success (see HR2010-0017, this issue). As Bergmann (1998: 289) pointed out, an 
‘unhappy event’ has to be reformulated as blameworthy or praiseworthy in order for it 
to become a topic for a moralizing discourse. Moral stories involve concerns about the 
social position of the self (and others), including issues of rights, duties, obligations, 
responsibility and potential blame (van Langenhove & Harré 1999: 23; Harré and van 
Langenhove, 1999). By drawing on classical Greek notions of agency, responsibility 
and character, we can map the behaviour of characters onto a moral order (Harré & 
Gillett, 1994: 113). In this moral order, having done something, or having failed to do 
something - to call an alert or stop something happening - are actions that attract 
evaluation and, potentially, condemnation. We focus in particular on the moral 
character of key actors in the recent financial crisis. In Sorkin’s (2009) story of the 
financial crisis, for example, descriptions of the scene where Fuld sweeps his arm 
across (the more senior) Kaplan’s desk, knocking his paperwork to the floor (p. 22), 
invite certain assessments of Fuld’s moral character – painting a picture of an arrogant 
and intemperate man with little care for authority.   
In this paper, we build upon previous analyses of public texts, such as Brown 
(2000, 2004, 2005), by highlighting the moral positioning at work in such texts. A 
Comment [A3]: Please replace with 
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core assumption underlying our approach is that it is through “the self-identifying 
narratives and their embeddedness in communal life that the individual can be held 
morally responsible” (Gergen, 1994: 103). For example, the report into the collapse of 
Barings Bank “paints a picture of Leeson as a clever and resourceful fraudster ...” 
(Brown, 2005: p.1588). From the perspective suggested here, this report is a tale “rich 
in motivation and replete with assignments of responsibility” (Edwards and Potter, 
1992: 54). This also means that a different tale can be told which would allocate 
responsibility differently. Thus, a storytelling perspective based on DDA, views 
stories as vehicles for constructing, rather than reflecting, the relationships between 
elements in a particular plot and within a particular moral order (Potter and Wetherell, 
2005: 18-19).  
 
Story-telling, Sensemaking and Discourse 
Stories are important because they are a key method through which people make 
sense of events. ‘Sensemaking’ is a broader term that refers to the process through 
which people interpret themselves and the world around them through the production 
of meaning (Weick, 1995). In a trouble-shooting context, for instance, stories will be 
told that attempt to make sense of the problem that now confronts the protagonists 
(Weick, 2001: 342). When trying to make sense of the origins of a crisis, authors will 
use ‘stories’ in order to colour the ‘background’ and make us understand the elements 
of the unfolding plot. Indeed, “organizational stories capture organizational life in a 
way that no compilation of facts ever can; this is because they are carriers of life 
itself, not just ‘reports’ on it” (Czarniawska, 1997: 21).  
Our aim in this paper is to outline the contribution of DDA for the study of 
organizational sensemaking and storytelling. We use the term ‘discursive devices’ 
from the field of Discursive Psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 68), although 
related terms such as “linguistic devices”, “rhetorical devices” and “discursive 
strategies” have also been used (eg. Watson, 1995: 806, 810, 812). Existing work in 
storytelling has pointed to the importance of “discursive devices” (Gabriel, 2000: 
115), but no systematic attempt has yet been made to map what these ‘devices’ are, or 
how they operate in the construction of stories. Discursive Psychology itself has a rich 
and varied intellectual heritage, drawing inspiration from the sociology of science, 
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ethnomethodology, conversational analysis and socio-linguistics. We seek to advance 
this project of synthesis by bringing together these micro-linguistic disciplines with 
fields that consider broader issues such as dramatism, rhetoric, storytelling and 
narrative. One of the central aims of DDA is to study protagonists' making sense of 
events as situated discursive practices. From a DDA perspective, discourse is studied 
not for what it reveals about mental processes, as in the correspondence model of 
language, but rather for how it acts as a flexible device for accounting for mental 
processes and, in so doing, achieving social actions (such as praising, blaming, 
excusing and so on). From a DDA perspective, sensemaking is viewed as a 
fundamentally social and situated activity, focussing on how “sense is built up 
sequentially [in interaction], turn-by-turn” during interaction with others (Speer & 
Potter, 2002: 159). The value of DDA lies in its understanding of how these displays 
of sense perform social actions. For example, in Weider’s (1974) classic study of a 
correctional half-way house for newly released prisoners, rules such as “do not snitch” 
performed the action of justifying a decision not to report the activities of fellow 
convicts. The rules were not cognitive structures that guided behaviour but rather 
were flexible resources for accounting for one’s actions.  
Two psychological categories are of particular relevance to this study of the 
financial crisis: memory and personality. We examine how both accounts of 
memories of past events (“what happened?”) and accounts of the personal dispositions 
of the self/other (“what type of person am I/are you?”) perform “pragmatic and 
rhetorical work” (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 54). For example, when “telling stories 
about past events … we do not (often) offer phenomenologies of merely conjuctive 
events, but provide tales rich in motivation and replete with assignments of 
responsibility” (ibid). The bankers in our study, for example, used DDs to work up a 
version of events, through their ‘memories’ of what happened, that sought “to 
externalise responsibility, to blame circumstances and avoid unfavourable personal 
attributions” (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 52). We use the term ‘character’ to refer to 
“different constructions of personhood, discursively available for placing in different 
kinds of narrative or to do different kinds of interpretive work” (ibid: 128). 
The term DDA encompasses a variety of approaches that differ in the extent to 
which they seek to combine other perspectives, such as narrative analysis or post-
structuralist ideas from Foucault, with the principles of CA and ethnomethodology 
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(Speer & Potter, 2002: 156). For some scholars who seek to adopt a more ‘purist’ 
alignment with CA, Discursive Psychology should not be connected to narrative 
analysis. We instead follow the existing work in Discursive Psychology that draws 
connections between particular discursive devices with the development of certain 
narrative characters and plots. Wetherell and Potter (1992), for instance, have pointed 
to the role of discourse in positioning as characters in an emerging plot: “some of the 
actors in these dramas are no more than dupes, foils and ignorant scapegoats, others 
are sinister, Machiavellian figures with immense power ...” (p.157). Others point to a 
long intellectual tradition of a “conversation-analytic approach to storytelling” 
(Antaki & Horowitz, 2000: 156) that goes back to Sacks, such as his work on ‘second 
stories’ (Potter & Te Molder, 2005: 24). Moreover, according to Czarniawska (1997: 
13), “one criticism of ethnomethodological thinking is that it has difficulty in 
explaining the connections between various rules of accounting, which appear to be 
ascribed to specific situations.” Hence, not all scholars using CA and 
ethnomethodology view storytelling as an antithetical approach: Lynch and Bogen 
(1996) focus on both the stories told in the Iran-Contra hearings and the stories of the 
hearings recounted in the popular press. We therefore follow van Dijk’s (1997: 28) 
call for “further integration of various directions of discourse studies” by forging 
productive links between the study of talk-in-interaction, rhetoric, story-telling and 
narrative.  
 Adopting this broader interpretation of DDA made us search for insights that 
could be gained from (ante-)narrative research as well as ethnomethodology 
approaches. Indeed, a major influence in this paper is Lynch and Bogen’s (1996) 
ethnomethodological study of the story-lines crafted by witnesses and defendants at 
the Iran-Contra hearings, based on testimonies from the 1987 investigation into the 
alleged sale of arms to Iran by senior U.S officials. The authors contrast the heroic 
storyline constructed by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North during his testimony with 
the picture of a delusional, power-hungry and pathological liar painted by the 
questioners and other witnesses. For some, North succeeded in presenting himself as a 
patriotic American hero, who acted in the ‘national interest’. Lynch and Bogen (1996) 
follow Sacks (1992) in asserting that “people tell stories in such ways as to control 
inferences about the moral character of the teller-as-character’s actions in the story” 
(Lynch & Bogen, 1996, p.283). We also take up Brown’s (2005) argument that 
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sensemaking is not a neutral, disinterested process but rather is a process ‘loaded’ 
with issues of power. Indeed, using an apt metaphor, just like telling a ‘good’ (i.e. 
convincing) story, for instance, enables actors to bolster their power and discount rival 
interpretations (Czarniawska, 1997). For us, the key question is: what discursive 
devices do people use to establish their version of the story as “what really 
happened”?  
 
Methodology 
The Discursive Devices Analysis (DDA) approach we employ involves a particular 
approach to data collection and analysis. First, DDA’s commitment to studying talk-
in-interaction means that we focus on naturally occurring data because it enables us to 
examine the stories constructed in situ by those involved in the sense-making 
following the financial crisis. These naturally occurring accounts are important 
precisely because they influenced the way in which the financial crisis was both 
understood and acted upon. Following Brown’s (2005) analysis of the reports 
following the collapse of Barings Bank, we view the Treasury Committee hearings as 
constituting an “important discursive contribution to people’s understanding of a 
significant episode in UK and global banking” (p. 1584). One limitation of this 
publically-available data source is that detailed Jeffersonian transcription, the 
established method of DP, was not possible. Only the official Treasury Committee 
transcription was available to us, meaning complex interactional features such as 
pauses and overlapping talk could not be transcribed. We acknowledge this 
methodological limitation, but remain convinced of the overall value of analysing 
public texts because they show how discourse is used in “creating, clarifying, 
sustaining and modifying” a particular “version of ‘reality’” (Brown, 2005: 1584).  
Second, our DDA approach brings with it certain ontological commitments. 
Following Discursive Psychology, DDA views talk as a medium of social action, 
rather than a reflection of inner cognitive entities, such as thoughts, memories, 
emotions or attitudes. Hence, the job of the analyst is not to delineate the ‘true’ or 
‘correct’ account among the competing versions produced by the questioners and 
witnesses in our study. “If people believe a story, if the story grips them, whether 
events actually happened or not is irrelevant” (Gabriel, 2000: 4). Hence we focus on 
the “range of styles, linguistic resources and rhetorical devices” (Edwards and Potter, 
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1992: 28) used to construct a ‘gripping’ story. For us, these ‘discursive devices’ are 
not stable cognitive entities; participants could well think and act in ways inconsistent 
with the particular story told in one encounter. This follows the principle outlined by 
Edwards and Potter (1992: 28) that “versions are likely to show variability according 
to the different interactional contexts they are constructed to serve”.  
The transcript we analyse was part of a series of meetings and reports 
announced by the UK Treasury Committee on 25 November 2008 as part of its 
Banking Crisis inquiry. The inquiry involved a series of 17 oral evidence sessions, 
which we term “hearings”, involving banking executives, senior politicians, regulators 
and experts. This paper focuses specifically on the hearing held on 10
th
 February 2009 
when four former bank executives were questioned by a range of MPs from across the 
political parties. The questions asked during the hearing were numbered in the 
publicly available transcript and are referenced accordingly (eg. Q1570) in our 
discussion. A list of the participants in the hearing quoted in this paper are given in 
Table 1 below.  
 
 
Role Name Position 
Questioners John McFall Chair of Treasury Committee 
John Mann MP, (Labour, Bassetlaw) 
Michael Fallon  MP (Conservative, Sevenoaks) (Chairman, 
Sub-Committee) 
Jim Cousins MP (Labour, Newcastle upon Tyne Central) 
Andrew Love  MP (Labour, Edmonton) 
Mark Todd  MP (Labour, South Derbyshire) 
Graham Brady MP (Conservative, Altrincham & Sale West) 
Witnesses Sir Tom McKillop Former Chairman of RBS Group plc 
Sir Fred Goodwin Former Chief Executive of RBS Group plc 
Lord Stevenson of 
Coddenham 
Member of the House of Lords, Former 
Chairman of HBOS plc 
Mr Andy Hornby Former Chief Executive of HBOS plc 
 
Table 1 Participants in Treasury Select Committee meeting 10 February 2009 
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We focus on this single hearing for two reasons. First, an analysis of the entire 
range of 17 hearings would not be compatible with the detailed analysis of discursive 
devices we pursue in this paper. The conversational analytic perspective adopted here 
has the advantage of demanding detailed analysis of specific conversational 
‘episodes’, that is turn-taking exchanges within the ‘back and forth’ of a conversation. 
According to Antaki and Horowitz (2000: 157), it is important to study “the 
development of a piece of social action as it accumulates over the length of an 
episode; that is especially apt in the case of a storytelling, which can build over many 
turns”. Second, we chose this single hearing because moral issues of blame and 
responsibility would be likely to be fore-grounded here: the British media singled out 
bankers in particular, running regular stories about greed and excessive bonus 
payments.  
The analysis was conducted through a process of coding the questions (by the 
MPs) and answers (by the bankers) within the transcript, to highlight the way that 
both events and actors were described. Taken in isolation, each question-answer 
sequence appeared somewhat separate, focused as they were on interrogating the 
bankers’ memories of their past actions and past events. Taken together, however, the 
two parties (MPs and bankers) appeared (to us) to build two competing plots about the 
events leading up to the financial crisis. It was through the process of analysis that we 
noticed that issues concerning the morality of the bankers appeared to be the central 
difference in the two competing storylines. While the categories used in Tables 2 and 
3 are our categories, based on our reading of the data, some were employed by the 
participants (or observers) themselves: for example, ‘victim’ was used by a questioner 
whilst ‘villain’ was used in a U.S. cross examination (of Fuld). Questions of morality, 
or indeed other sensitive issues such as ‘interests’, are typically dealt with implicitly 
rather than explicitly precisely because of their sensitivity (Potter, 1996: 148; Whittle 
& Mueller, 2011). Indeed, the value of DDA lies in its appreciation of how 
accusation, blame, responsibility and so on are performed implicitly through 
inferences, where listeners are invited to ‘hear’ a certain attribution in the description 
of events. For example, the accusation of ‘vested interests’ against the Islamic 
establishment by writer Salman Rushdie analysed by Potter (1996: 125) is done 
through inference. In our case, for instance, the question “Did any of that go to your 
head?” is a more subtle, and probably more convincing, way of insinuating that the 
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person is arrogant, egotistical and self-absorbed than an explicit accusation as such. In 
fact, Edwards and Potter (1992: 103) argue that criticisms of this kind “are very often 
precisely the occasion for extended sequences of competing descriptions as 
participants formulate the scene to display their moral status.” Hence, the term 
‘villain’ was not used by the questioners themselves, it was instead ‘invited’ as an 
inference from the phrasing of their questions. Similarly, the term ‘victim’ was 
inferred in the discourse of the bankers, not used explicitly.  
 
 
Two Tales of the Financial Crisis 
There are only so many ways to emplot (give a plot to) a narrative and it is likely that 
any new story-telling, whether consciously or not, draws on some of the archetypal 
structures of emplotment. Frye (1957/71: 163-239), White (1978: 70) and 
Czarniawska (2004: 21) all distinguish between comedy, romance, tragedy and irony 
or satire. Booker (2004), however, argues that there are seven main types of plot-line 
used in classic stories: the Quest, Rags to Riches, Overcoming the Monster, Re-birth, 
Comedy, Tragedy and Voyage and Return. Building on this typology, we make sense 
of the narratives constructed during the Treasury hearing in terms of two plot 
structures: tragedy and overcoming-the-monster.  
Finer distinctions can be drawn within each category: Czarniawska (2004: 22) 
distinguished between two types of tragedy emplotment, namely a triumphant one and 
a fatalistic one. Gabriel (2000) also identifies ‘gripes’ as a sub-category of tragedies, 
which are “tragic stories without a villain, the victim usually attributing his or her 
misfortunes to error, negligence, or system failures” (Gabriel, 2000: 72). According to 
Booker (2004: 156), the tragedy pattern typically unfolds by going through five 
distinct stages: in the Anticipation stage, the hero (or heroine) is in some way 
incomplete or unfulfilled. In the dream stage, he (or she) becomes in some way 
committed to a course of action (eg. Faust signing his pact with the devil). In the 
Frustration stage, slowly things start to go wrong. In the Nightmare stage, things are 
comprehensively slipping out of the hero’s control accompanied by a mounting sense 
of threat and despair, with the forces of fate and opposition closing in. In the 
Destruction stage, either by hostile forces or his own act, the hero is destroyed. We 
argue that a form of the ‘tragedy’ emplotment is used by the questioners at the 
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Treasury enquiry, which we label ‘Storyline 1’ (see Table 2). The main difference lies 
in the portrayal of the bankers in our case as ‘villain’ rather than ‘hero’. According to 
the MP’s storyline, the (in-)actions of the bankers are portrayed as the ultimate source 
of the financial crisis. 
In the overcoming-the-monster plot, there is also a sub-plot in which there is a 
“relentless build-up towards some inevitable doom, followed in the nick of time by 
miraculous deliverance” (Booker, 2004: 46). The term ‘monster’ does not necessarily 
refer to a huge ‘beast’ or ‘ogre’. In many stories using this plot, the monster is a huge 
and menacing impersonal event or force, such as a mysterious plague (Camus), or a 
threatening pendulum (E A Poe). We argue that this alternative emplotment of the 
financial crisis is put forward by the bankers, what we call ‘Storyline 2’ (see Table 2), 
where it is an overwhelming and impersonal force that threatened the global economic 
system – as opposed to their own (in-)actions. There are some elements that suggest a 
hero-in-an-epic narrative, albeit without the typical ‘happy ending’. The breakdown of 
the system in the weeks following the Lehman collapse is portrayed in Storyline 2 as a 
‘temporary’ defeat followed by ‘ultimate’ victory: the bankers imply that a much 
worse crisis has been averted thanks to their swift actions. This would then still fall 
under the ‘epic’ category: “Defeats are important parts of epic plots, though their 
main purpose is to allow the hero to show his or her fortitude and sacrifice, helping to 
reinforce the poetic effect of the crowning triumph” (Gabriel, 2000: 77).  
For Kenneth Burke (1969: xv), life is not just like a drama, life is a drama. 
When we interact, we employ all the features of a human drama to tell a compelling 
story: using the features of the act, scene, agent(s), agency and purpose to narrate a 
version of what happened and why it happened. We follow Czarniawska (1999: 64) in 
viewing Burke’s pentad as that which “permits creating a plot.” According to Burke 
(1969: 56), the pentad provides a synoptic framework for mapping the way people 
narrate events. Table 2 uses Burke’s Pentad to summarize our view of the two 
competing storylines crafted by the questioners (MPs) and witnesses (banking 
executives). Mills (1940: 905), drawing on Burke, uses the term ‘vocabulary of 
motive’ which means that any action is not driven in real time by a determining 
motive, but can be described under different vocabularies of motive. For example, 
with regard to one and the same action, a soldier may be motivated to kill (nationally) 
and, simultaneously, “motivated by a horror of killing” individually (Burke, 1969: 
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37). For Burke, the scene-act and scene-agent ‘emphases’ or ‘ratios’ are crucial. 
Where the scene dominates in the scene-agent ratio, this requires “that the 
‘brutalizing’ situation contain ‘brutalized’ characters as its dialectical counterpart” 
(Burke, 1969: 9). In effect, this replaces ‘acting’ with being ‘moved’ (ibid: 10). 
Indeed, in a materialistic vocabulary, we assign “scenic terms to motives situated in 
the agent” (Burke, 1969: 49), for example by emphasizing the overwhelming power 
of ‘objective circumstances’. Burke made the important point that when referring to 
our jobs/roles under ‘capitalist industrialism’, “often the element of action is reduced 
to a minimum and the element of sheer motion raised to a maximum” (p.14), such as 
in reference to ‘market forces’. Here, the agent/agency is sidelined and it is the scene 
that does the ‘work’ of the story.  
Burke’s point about ratios is significant for our purposes because the stories 
told by the MPs and bankers differed significantly in the scene-agent ratios they used. 
The MPs emphasised the agent in their version of the story, seeking to place 
responsibility on the shoulders of the bankers being questioned. Emphasising the 
agency of the agent is crucial for a tragedy plot: “The attribution of guilt to a 
malevolent agent or suitable scapegoat is a central theme of tragic stories” (Gabriel, 
2000: 49). The bankers, in contrast, emphasised aspects of the scene: the background 
setting of new financial products and practices, global interconnection of institutions, 
market forces and so on. The bankers downplayed or denied their own role as agents: 
either through reference to other agents (eg. regulators, credit reference agencies, 
shareholders etc) or by reference to a wider collective force (eg. the Board, markets, 
culture). These narrative structures are not unique to our case. According to Gabriel 
(2000: 40), denying (or downplaying) the role of the agent/agency is a common tactic 
for “cast[ing] a possible villain in the role of a victim”. Moreover, these different 
ratios are important, we suggest, because they produce different ways of making sense 
of what happened and why. As Table 2 shows, where the two storylines differ most is 
regarding the cause of the tragedy. In Storyline 1, crafted collectively by the thirteen 
MPs and the Chairman of the Committee, the tale is one of greedy, unscrupulous and 
immoral ‘villain’ bankers who almost singlehandedly brought down the global 
economy. In Storyline 2, crafted collectively by the four banking executive witnesses, 
the tale is one of a global financial tsunami that they did not create, could not have 
predicted and to which they are themselves ‘victims’.  
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 Storyline 1: Bankers are 
the villains that brought 
down the world 
Storyline 2: Bankers are the 
victims of a financial 
tsunami 
Narrator(s) Jointly narrated by Treasury 
Committee questioners (13 
UK politicians plus 
Chairman) 
Jointly narrated by Treasury 
Committee witnesses (four 
UK banking executives and 
former executives) 
Over-arching Plot Tragedy, with bankers as 
villains. 
Over-coming the monster (a 
variant of the epic), with 
bankers as victims of an 
impersonal force. 
Act  
(what happened?) 
A financial crisis has 
occurred and we need to find 
out who is to blame (to avoid 
a future repeat of events) 
A financial crisis has occurred 
in which nobody is to blame. 
Scene  
(what was the 
setting?) 
Weak regulation, power in 
the hands of banking 
executives, short-termism, 
risk-taking. 
Complex new financial 
instruments (eg. derivatives), 
due diligence, ongoing 
regulation. 
Agents  
(who was 
involved?) 
Individual banking 
executives were the most 
significant agents (and 
therefore held responsible).  
Established ‘practices’, 
‘policies’ and ‘cultures’ acted, 
which were widely accepted 
by regulators, shareholders, 
Boards and credit reference 
agencies (making everyone 
collectively responsible). 
Agency  
(how did those 
agents act?) 
Bankers designed complex 
financial products that made 
them huge sums of money at 
the expense of long-term 
stability. 
Bankers designed complex 
financial products in the 
interests of economic growth 
and prosperity, led by market 
forces..  
Purpose  
(why did it 
happen?) 
The crisis happened because 
bankers acted (immorally) 
out of greed, negligence and 
arrogance, lining their own 
pockets at the expense of 
other stakeholders. 
The crisis happened because 
of the complexity of the 
financial market, which 
nobody could have predicted 
collapsing. A ‘transcendental 
version’ sees just punishment 
being meted out against 
fallible human beings. 
 
Table 2  Competing storylines constructed during Treasury Select 
Committee hearing on 10
th
 February 2009 
 
The moral status of the bankers (i.e. as ethical or unethical people) is a crucial theme 
of the plot of both storylines. In the two sections that follow, we analyse a series of 
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extracts from these two storylines to illustrate the role of discursive devices in 
building these contrasting moral landscapes.  
 
Storyline 1: The Making of a Villain 
Formally, the Chairman stated the aims of the hearing as “a) to find out how we 
arrived at this situation; b) how we get ourselves through this present severe economic 
recession; and c) what the future of regulation in the financial services will look like” 
(Q1644). Yet, as Lynch and Bogen (1996) argue in their analysis of the Iran-contra 
affair, “when the interrogator invites the witness to tell his story, he makes it clear that 
he already has in hand a version of the events and their circumstances against which 
he can compare that story” (p. 162). The use of certain discursive devices in the 
construction of their questions, we argue, enabled the MPs in our case to narrate their 
own story about the causes of the crisis. We focus our attention here on how the 
questioners framed the moral responsibility of the bankers.  
The first extract we have chosen to analyse concerns the moral positioning 
around the notion of injustice. At several points in the proceedings, the questioners 
make a pointed show of highlighting the salaries of the bankers. One such example is 
given below. 
 
Q1656 Mr Brady: Sir Fred, I think in 2007 your remuneration was £4.1 million or 
thereabouts, of which about two-thirds was in the form of a bonus. Mr Hornby, I think 
the figure for you was about £1.9 million, about half of which was bonus.  
 
A discussion of remuneration practices then followed these remarks. Later, however, 
the questioners employ a device known as rhetorical contrast (Edwards & Potter, 
1992: 138, 146) to highlight the moral status of the bankers.  
 
Q1705  John Mann: How much is JSA for an adult of, say, age 42?  
Mr Hornby: I beg your pardon?  
Q1706  John Mann: Job Seekers Allowance?  
Mr Hornby: I do not know the precise amount but it is a very low quantity of money. 
Q1707  John Mann: Because that would be the profile of the bank staff and I think it 
is your age as well. I do not know whether you are going to be relying on £60.50 of 
Job Seekers Allowance?  
Mr Hornby: I accept the fact I am a similar age to the average age. 
Extract 1 
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The questioner (MP John Mann) asks Mr Hornby (former Chief Executive of HBOS 
plc) the amount of money given to the unemployed on Job Seekers Allowance in 
Britain. We classify this as a rhetorical question because Mann clearly knows the 
answer to the question already (see Q1707) and presumably asks the question to elicit 
a moral account rather than a factual response. Mann sets up a rhetorical contrast 
between the salary of those (he claims are) responsible for the crisis (banking 
executives like Hornby), and those who are ‘innocent victims’ of the crisis (bank staff 
who have lost their jobs). The story implied here is one of an evil villain enjoying the 
‘spoils’ of his greedy actions while his victims suffer in poverty. In so doing, the MP 
appeals to the universal grammar of “monetary motive” (Burke, 1969: 44) to explain 
the cause of the crisis. The monetary motive itself is not questioned here: it is rather 
the injustice of the distribution of riches that is the target of condemnation. 
Interestingly, Hornby refuses to ‘play along’ with this storyline and accepts the story 
only on a ‘technical’ rather than ‘moral’ level. He accepts that he is a “similar age to 
the average age” but refuses to be drawn into reflection on the moral injustice of the 
contrast between his ‘riches’ and the poverty of his ‘victims’.  In so doing, he contests 
the moral positioning of the ‘villain’ character being constructed by the questioner. 
Our second extract concerns the moral standing of the bankers in terms of 
questions of their incompetence, lack of care and duty, self-interest and greed.  
 
Q1695  John Mann: Mr Hornby, are you personally culpable, or is it essentially bad 
luck that leaves you to be facing the music for your industry today? In other words, 
are there bankers out there at the moment who are thinking, "There but for the grace 
of God go I"?  
Mr Hornby: I have already said on behalf of the Board we accept full responsibility 
and have apologised for the events that have taken place, so please do not in any way 
suggest that I am trying to avoid personal responsibility. …  
Extract 2 
 
Mann sets up an invitation for Hornby to assess his own moral status as somebody 
who is either morally unethical by virtue of being responsible for the events 
(“personally culpable”) or an innocent victim of outside events (“bad luck”). We view 
this as the rhetorical use of attributional discourse (Edwards and Potter, 1992: Ch 5), 
in this case attribution of cause, where the issue of who (or what) we can attribute as 
the cause of events is accomplished. In attributional discourse, versions are 
constructed to “assign responsibility and negotiate moral issues of blame, duty and 
praise” (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 127). Mann invites the listener to compare and 
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contrast the two competing storylines being crafted by the questioners (Storyline 1) 
and bankers (Storyline 2). He also invites the bankers to declare their allegiance to 
one of these storylines: either “I was wrong and I am to blame” (an issue of 
unscrupulous morals and bad character: Storyline 1) or “I was just unlucky and 
anybody else would have done the same” (an issue of somebody just doing their job 
but being victim to external forces: Storyline 2).  
Hornby deals with this attribution of cause in an interesting way. He actually 
concedes and accepts the questioner’s storyline by accepting “full responsibility” for 
the events. Is this evidence, therefore, of the victory of Storyline 1? Our analysis of 
Hornby’s response suggests otherwise. Hornby uses the collective pronoun term “we” 
rather than “I” by accepting responsibility “on behalf of the Board”. This presents him 
as part of a Board of Directors who made decisions collectively, thereby distributing 
blame and responsibility. He presents himself as someone who was just ‘doing his 
job’ and following the decisions made by the Board. “He is innocent in the sense that 
what happens to him is far greater than anything he has done provokes, like the 
mountaineer whose shout brings down an avalanche” (Frye, 1957/71: 41). 
The DDA approach offers a valuable lens on the moral work being done here by 
showing how descriptions of past events are not neutral recollections of memories but 
rather act to deal with issues of responsibility, blame and moral standing. In our case, 
Hornby’s subtle attribution of responsibility to “the Board” (rather than himself) 
mitigates against the (actual or potential) accusation that he was personally culpable. 
In short, Hornby uses attributional discourse to appear to cooperate with the story 
being constructed by his questioners (Storyline 1), while also attempting to translate 
this into his preferred alternative version of events (Storyline 2).   
The next extract is important because it shows how a similar translation of 
meaning occurs in the framing of agency.  
 
Q1671  Mr Fallon: Why did you and your Board allow Sir Fred to go ahead with this 
huge deal without an escape clause when ABN had already pre-sold LaSalle, when 
the credit crunch had already begun, and when everybody else said you were paying 
too much?  
Sir Tom McKillop: The premise that we allowed Sir Fred to proceed implies that this 
was driven by Sir Fred, which is not the case. When the announcement of the ABN 
Amro merger with Barclays was made the Board received a presentation from our 
strategy group and the executive team, an analysis of the ABN Amro businesses; we 
looked at that in considerable detail. The Board had 18 meetings between March 
when we received that first analysis following the announcement by Barclays and 
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ABN, in which ABN Amro was considered at every one of those. There was no 
proposition to buy ABN Amro at the first meeting; it was an analysis session. At 
every stage the whole Board considered this and were unanimous in the steps we 
took. It is wrong to characterise it as a proposition driven by Sir Fred that the Board 
were unable to stop. 
Extract 3 
 
The insights from DP enable us to understand how the attribution of agency works in 
this extract. According to Edwards and Potter (1992: 103), “attributional issues of 
blame and agency [are] dealt with precisely via the construction of alternative 
descriptions”. Attributing responsibility for wrongdoing may be done jointly with 
reporting of an ‘unhappy’ incident (Pomerantz, 1978). Here, the questioner (MP 
Michael Fallon) tells a story of a ‘plan’ (the decision to purchase ABN Amro) that 
was hatched by a central character, “Sir Fred” (Sir Fred Goodwin, former Chief 
Executive of RBS Group plc). The others involved are implicitly cast as being 
‘duped’ into following this central character in spite of the apparent ‘madness’ of the 
plan (“the credit crunch had already begun” and “everybody else said you were 
paying too much”). Sir Fred is thereby presented as the villain hatching a cunning 
plan, presumably to line his own pockets (although this is not explicitly stated), while 
his ‘accomplices’ were presumably too stupid, loyal or similarly motivated by greed 
to stop him.  
McKillop, former Chairman of RBS Group plc, immediately rejects the 
‘premise’ of this story. He constructs his own attribution of agency in which Sir Fred 
is not the evil villain who hatched the plot and controlled everyone else ‘under his 
spell’. The plot is re-cast as a carefully considered decision, based on detailed 
analysis, lengthy discussions and “unanimous” agreement by everyone on the Board. 
A particular scene-act ratio (Burke, 1969: 13) is deployed to “substantiate this 
judgement”: “The scene-act ratio can be applied… deterministically in statements that 
a certain policy had to be adopted in a certain situation”. Descriptions of the scene 
where “18 meetings” had led to a “unanimous” decision of the “whole Board” work to 
warrant the act of purchasing ABN Amro. The decision was portrayed not as a 
‘cunning and greedy plan’ hatched by a single villain but part of the normal, rational 
process that not only this Board, but all Boards of Directors, routinely follow. 
McKillop implies that the hunt for the villain is futile: there is no villain, weakening 
the foundations of the MPs storyline.  
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In the final four extracts below, the questioners tackle the issue of moral 
responsibility head-on. We have excluded the responses for reasons of space, but 
needless to say that each ‘accusation’ is immediately and vigorously denied by the 
‘accused’ (the reader is invited to check the publicly available document). These 
extracts employ what Antaki (1998: 71) calls identity ascription: explicitly ascribing a 
particular identity – a particular set of personality traits, attitudes and moral 
dispositions – to a person.  
 
Q1863  Jim Cousins: Sir Tom, have you either asked for or been given any 
legal advice on the nature of criminal negligence?  
Extract 4 
 
Q1873  Mr Love: Okay, let me come back to that. Sir Fred, I read with 
interest the biography you gave to us which tells us that you were number one 
in Scotland on Sunday's annual power list for several years in a row, European 
Banker of the Year in 2004, European Business Leader of the Future as well. 
Did any of that go to your head?  
Extract 5 
 
Q1874  Mr Love: Can I ask you, Mr Hornby, you were a Managing Director 
in Asda before you were 30 and you were the CEO of HBOS before you were 
40. Did your reputation as a wunderkid affect you in any way?  
Extract 6 
 
Q1880  John Mann: Sir Fred, you made the extraordinary statement to Mr 
Cousins in response to a question in that you defended the strong financial 
position and good business position of the bank on 16 September and, three 
weeks later, the Government was having to stick in £20 billion of capital to 
keep the bank going. I put it to you that you do not like criticism, do you? You 
like people who bring you the good news and you do not like people who 
bring you the bad news.  
Extract 7 
 
A particular moral picture of the key characters is painted in these extracts. Extract 4 
implies that McKillop is potentially guilty of criminal negligence, being so motivated 
by self-interest that he failed to protect the interests of the Bank. In Extracts 5 and 6, 
the implication is that both Goodwin and Hornby were driven by their arrogance, 
vanity, egotism and sense of self-importance. The main character in the story, 
according to the rhetoric of ‘attributions of motive’ employed by the questioners in 
Extract 7, is a negligent, arrogant, vain, self-serving agent. We propose that the moral 
status of the central character - the evil villain banker - is pieced together, turn by 
turn, in the way questions such as these are constructed. Moreover, a particular scene-
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agent ratio (Burke, 1969) is employed. In all these questions, aspects of the agent 
(what type of person the bankers are) are emphasised over and above aspects of the 
scene (the background setting in which the bankers acted).  
The final extract we analyze is important precisely because the identity of the 
bankers as ‘victim’ or ‘villain’ is tackled head-on. This extract is relevant for our 
purposes because it deals explicitly with the participants’ own moral assessment of 
the character of the bankers. 
 
Q1819  Mr Todd: You are presenting yourselves gently as victims in this process?  
  Lord Stevenson of Coddenham: No. What can be quite plain, the denial, absolutely 
not. … 
Extract 8 
 
MP Mark Todd uses a combination of two discursive devices: identity ascription 
(Antaki, 1998: 71) and reflexive conceptualization (Auburn, 2005: 701). Reflexive 
conceptualization refers to instances where speaker’s explicitly reflect on the meaning 
of their own (or others’) talk, to guide hearers towards a particular interpretation. This 
kind of “talk about talk” is a pervasive feature of everyday interaction because it 
enables speakers to “cancel, substitute or renew” prior segments of their talk (Auburn, 
2005: 701). In Extract 8, Todd reflexively summarises the bankers’ prior talk as 
guiding the hearer towards viewing them as ‘victims’. By using these two discursive 
devices, Todd invites the audience to assess the plausibility of the story of the 
bankers. Are you trying to make us think of you as victims? Should we believe you? 
Although Stevenson unequivocally rejects this idea, what these DDs do is serve to 
subtly undermine the bankers’ storyline, by ‘exposing’ their attempts to avoid taking 
responsibility by claiming to be a ‘victim’. The morality of the bankers is thereby 
questioned even further: not only are they to blame because of their greed and 
arrogance, they are also strategic manipulators, dishonorably trying to dodge blame 
and shirk responsibility.  
 
Storyline 2: The Making of a Victim 
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It was not surprising that the bankers sought to resist, re-cast and re-frame the moral 
story crafted by the MPs above. In this section, we examine some of the key 
discursive devices used by the bankers to construct their own ‘moral story’. 
While the questioners attempted to portray the bankers as arrogant, greedy and 
negligent, the bankers attempted to re-cast their characters in more moral, humane and 
sympathetic terms.  
 
Q1641  Chairman: Thank you very much. May I start by saying this is an opportunity 
for you to provide your side of the story. Maybe my first question has been leaked if we 
look at the papers this morning; maybe all the questions have been leaked. However, is 
"sorry", the hardest part, Lord Stevenson?  
Lord Stevenson of Coddenham: No, Chairman, and thank you for giving us the 
opportunity, right upfront, because there has been a lot of talk about the "s" word. You 
have given me the opportunity to repeat what both Andy and I said to our shareholders 
when we met them at the EGM, that we are profoundly and, I think I would say, 
unreservedly sorry at the turn of events. Our shareholders, all of us, have lost a great 
deal of money, including of course a great number of our colleagues, and we are very 
sorry for that. There has been huge anxiety and uncertainty caused in particular for our 
colleagues but also for periods of time for our customers. I would also say, Chairman, 
we are sorry at the effect it has had on the communities we serve. There is nothing 
sudden, there is no turn of events; we said it publicly at the EGM and we have felt it 
throughout.  
Extract 9 
Edwards (1997) argues that empathy is a device that can be used to make a person 
(and their actions) appear more balanced, justified and sensitive. Stevenson, the 
former Chairman of HBOS plc, not only repeats his “profound and unreserved” 
apology but elaborates in some detail on his sympathy and concern for the impact on a 
range of actors: shareholders, colleagues, customers, communities. He presents 
himself as someone who both understands and feels the position of others affected by 
the crisis. He also presents his feelings of sorrow and regret as sincere, not just 
“sudden” and prompted by the question, but rather something he has felt 
“throughout”.  
Why is the empathy device important for the storylines constructed during this 
hearing? Empathy is an important device for moral storytelling because it is more 
difficult to cast someone into the role of ‘villain’ if they display themselves as caring 
and compassionate persons. Villains are expected to be callous, ruthless and 
unconcerned by the misery and destruction brought about by their actions. While 
displaying empathy does not mean that the protagonist avoids blame for what 
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happened, they are no longer cast as a wicked and malevolent villain. Stevenson 
presents himself as someone who may have made “bad decisions” (technical 
dimension) but is not a “bad person” (moral dimension). Many of the character traits 
of the typical “epic hero” described by Gabriel (2000: 76) are inferred here: “loyal, 
impetuous, decisive, wise, controlled, dedicated, compassionate, approachable, loving 
and caring”. 
Some other important devices are employed in Stevenson’s reply. First, notice 
how he specifically apologizes for the “turn of events”. Nominalisation (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992: 154) refers to the process of replacing nouns with verbs, adjectives or 
adverbs to avoid mentioning those who performed the action, particularly to avoid 
attribution of blame or responsibility. For example, “Police killed the rioters” is 
transformed into “The killing of the rioters”. In this extract, Stevenson avoids 
mentioning his own role (i.e. “I am sorry for what I did”) by avoiding a personal pro-
noun and instead saying he was sorry for “the turn of events”. Similarly, in the Iran-
Contra hearings analyzed by Lynch and Bogen (1996), Oliver North deviates from his 
typical self-presentation of himself as a man of action by making his agency 
peripheral to the event by saying “he became aware of what was really trying to be 
moved” (sic), referring to the shipment of Hawk missiles (p. 165).  
Second, the phrase “turn of events” also relies on a device known as 
externalisation or ‘out-there-ness’. Externalization refers to the process by which 
actions and events are presented as out of the control of the actor, simply part of the 
‘world out there’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 105). Accounts are often carefully worked 
up to present what they describe as “out there”, lying outside the account itself 
(Potter, 1996: Ch 6). In Extract 9, Stevenson presents himself as simply ‘caught up’ in 
events beyond his control. In terms of Burke’s (1969) concept of ratios, aspects of the 
scene are emphasised over the actions of the agent. There was a “turn of events” in 
which the bankers simply found themselves ‘caught up in’, unable to control.  
Third and finally, notice how Stevenson emphasises that the crisis has affected 
not only shareholders, but “all of us”. This can be seen as an example of membership 
categorization (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 51, 160), that is, the group categories used to 
describe yourself and others, including what responsibilities, expectations, rights and 
obligations are involved. Stevenson’s claim that “all of us” have been affected 
constructs a common group with a common identity: “we are all in this together”. In 
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fact, Goodwin later recounts the “considerable losses for me and my colleagues who 
have shares in the company”, and Hornby later states: “I have lost considerably more 
money in my shares than I have been paid”. What this membership categorisation (“I 
am just like you, I have been hurt too”) helps to achieve is an image of their character 
as an innocent victim rather than wicked villain by inviting this question: Surely we 
cannot be villains if we have suffered as well?   
Our final extracts are instances where the bankers used the discursive device of 
concession by accepting certain elements of the MP’s storyline (Storyline 1). 
Rhetorically, conceding a counter-argument is not always a sign of defeat. On the 
contrary, a concession is an example of a ‘reflexive comment’ that presents the 
speaker as critical of themselves and their own ideas, and therefore to be trusted as a 
fair judge (Mulholland, 1994: 82). In fact, according to Antaki & Wetherell (1999), a 
‘show’ concession makes “a show of conceding and, in making such a show, fortifies 
the speaker’s position against misunderstanding or attack” (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999: 
23). The two extracts that follow demonstrate the important rhetorical work 
performed by concession in our study: in a counter-intuitive way, concession acted to 
bolster the banker’s own storyline (Storyline 2) rather than affirm the MP’s opposing 
storyline (Storyline 1).  
 
Lord Stevenson of Coddenham: … Looking back, with the wisdom of hindsight, we 
did not foresee the deterioration in asset values that took place, it is as simple as that.  
(Answer to Q1833) 
Extract 10 
 
Mr Hornby: I think if you look hard at the facts from 2006 and 2007 when I took 
over as CEO, we did try and preserve capital, we stopped the buyback programme, 
we reduced asset growth and we pulled back on mortgage market share. Of course, 
looking back, I would have liked to have done even more and I concur with the views 
that other people have said on the panel. We did not fully prophesize the complete 
closure of wholesale markets post-Lehman's when wholesale markets were operating 
on an overnight basis. We did prophesize reductions in liquidity. I believe there are 
very few people in the world who foresaw the complete collapse and I regret that 
because clearly I would have tried to pull back even more.  
(Answer to Q1748) 
Extract 11 
 
These two concessions are interesting precisely for how they help to construct the 
moral standing of the protagonists. In Extract 10, Lord Stevenson concedes that he did 
not “foresee” the crash in asset values. In Extract 11, Hornby similarly concedes that 
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he did not “prophesize” the collapse of the wholesale markets following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. We analyze these as ‘show’ concessions (Antaki & Wetherell, 
1999: 23) because they make a show of conceding a point that does not actually 
question their moral integrity. Rather, they re-formulate the MP’s storyline by 
trivializing the accusation and acknowledging the obvious. How could anyone be 
expected to be a ‘fortune teller’ and predict the crash in the markets? Or single-
handedly control how the markets reacted? The concessions act to undermine the 
storyline crafted by the questioners (Storyline 1) by highlighting the impossible moral 
and technical standards being expected of the characters. In terms of Burke’s (1969) 
concept of ratios, emphasising the role of the scene (the setting in which the act took 
place) - such as “deterioration in asset values”, “closure of wholesale markets” and 
“reductions in liquidity” - served to minimise the role of the agent (bankers).  
 
Discussion 
During the testimony we have analysed, the bankers had to achieve a complex 
balancing act: they did not want to discredit the system as a whole; nor did they want 
to blame the leading actors (which included themselves). This task of ‘accounting for 
failure’ is often a tricky task. For vegans, for instance, discursive devices (such as 
presenting veganism as ‘easy’ and ‘normal’) enable advocates to put the blame for 
nutritional deficits on the agent “without degrading or undermining the ideal itself” 
(Sneijder & te Molder, 2005: 677). Vegans have been found to use script formulations 
– such as “it’s almost impossible to lack anything [nutrients]” (Sneijder & te Molder, 
2005: 682) - to claim that the problem is not with veganism per se but the individual’s 
fault for failing to adopt a ‘correct’ vegan diet. What these devices achieve is to 
account for failure while maintaining faith in the system itself. Accounting for error in 
this way is crucial to the maintenance of an ideology: whether it is the ideology of 
veganism or the ideology of free market capitalism. An even more complex kind of 
attribution is made by the bankers in our case: they do not think that the system 
should be radically changed; nor did the main agents act recklessly. Neither the 
system nor the agent should be blamed or punished. Quite simply, system failures are 
very rare (‘once in a lifetime’), therefore we should retain our faith in the system. 
Thus, a rare nature-like disaster (like a plague or hurricane) was constructed to play 
the role of the villain in the story and ‘explain’ the financial crisis. 
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The pattern of storytelling we have analysed here has relevance beyond the 
UK: it is being repeated around the world. When Fuld, the CEO of Lehmann Brothers, 
sat down for a congressional hearing after the Lehman collapse, John Mica, a 
Republican congressman said to him “If you haven’t discovered your role, you’re the 
villain today. You’ve got to act like a villain” (Sorkin, 2009: 505). However, Fuld 
himself had lost extraordinary amounts of money due to the Lehman bankruptcy: 
shares that were once worth 1bn dollars had declined in value to a paltry 65 thousand 
dollars. He, like our protagonists, tried to extract empathy from his listeners by 
suggesting he was a fellow victim: “As incredibly painful as this is for all those 
connected to or affected by Lehman Brothers, this financial tsunami is much bigger 
than any one firm or industry” (p.506). The metaphor of a tsunami is therefore 
centrally important here (used by Fuld but also the Chairman, in way of attribution, in 
Q1899 in our case): it presents the events as analogous to extreme weather conditions 
that are beyond the control of the individuals involved and which indiscriminately 
creates victims. Indeed, the prototypical “cultural symbolism” of the victim is built 
around a person “faced with forces over which he or she has no control” (Gabriel, 
2000: 48). Interestingly, the tsunami metaphor was also invoked in the recent 
testimonies to the U.S. Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission – pointing to the 
potential for a global pattern of storytelling. Burke’s (1969) notion of scene-agent 
ratio is significant for understanding the power of the tsunami metaphor: emphasising 
elements of the scene through reference to materialism, the “matter and motion” (p. 
131) of the physical world. Descriptions of the scene as a ‘tsunami’ invokes the idea 
of laws of cause-and-effect beyond the control of the individual’s “reason and mind” 
(p. 171), downplaying the role of the agent.  
Thus, the story-line crafted by the bankers themselves defends the morality of 
their character by presenting their actions as morally sound and widely accepted as 
legitimate. A potentially blameworthy action, such as a substantial change in the 
company’s leverage, becomes re-formulated as part of a sudden and unexpected 
nature-like disaster: the disaster is the result of a ‘global tsunami’ and the bankers 
themselves are victims. The moral vocabulary is one of joint suffering, cooperation 
(to get through this) and non-competitiveness (in an emergency we need to fight our 
competitive instincts). This is diametrically opposed to the moral vocabulary normally 
employed by senior executives which is about ‘market value’, competition between 
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firms and in labour markets, highly competitive compensation, and rampant 
individualism (McDonald, 2010).  
The discursive devices we have analysed performed a particular social action for 
both the MPs and the bankers, namely the “casting” and “re-casting” of the moral 
status of their character. One set of devices worked to paint a picture of a greedy, 
arrogant, negligent villain (Storyline 1), while another set worked to re-cast the 
bankers in positive moral terms as caring, compassionate and competent types of 
people (Storyline 2). Table 3 summarises the discursive devices we have identified in 
the two storylines. 
 
Storyline 1: Tragedy 
Bankers are the villains that brought 
down the world 
Storyline 2: Overcoming the 
(Impersonal) Monster 
Bankers are the victims of a financial 
tsunami 
Rhetorical contrast 
Attribution of cause 
Attribution of agency 
Identity ascription 
Reflexive conceptualisation 
Empathy 
Nominalisation 
Externalisation 
Membership categorisation 
Show concession 
Re-formulation 
Table 3  Discursive devices used in the construction of the two story-lines 
  
Story-line 1 is a variation of how a Tragedy can be emplotted. Let us briefly reflect on 
the typical structure of a tragedy: already in the beginning stage, something is, at least 
slightly, ‘wrong’. The seeds are sown early. In every instance of tragedy that Booker 
(2004) discusses, the hero’s obsession is drawing them into “something which 
violates and defies some prohibition or law or convention or duty or commitment or 
standard of normality. They are being tempted into stepping outside the bounds which 
circumscribe them” (ibid. p.174). But within these commonalities, there are 
distinctions, indeed gradations exist “according to the extent to which the hero or 
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heroine is primarily the malevolent author of other people’s sufferings, or is just a 
victim of his or her own folly” (ibid. p.182). In Storyline 1 constructed by the MPs, 
“malevolence” was a crucial element of their story: transgression of moral standards 
demanded some form of public humiliation and retribution. Story-line 2, constructed 
by the bankers, we interpreted as an example of an Overcoming the Monster plot, 
albeit with an impersonal monster: the plague (Camus) creates widespread devastation 
and salvation only comes in the last minute. There is no villain here, just victims 
trying to save themselves and salvage what they can from the devastation around 
them; plus an element of heroism from those (Paulson, Dimon, Brown) who made the 
system function again (Paulson, 2010; McDonald, 2010; Brown, 2010). 
Our analysis shows that there are different ways to emplot the narrative of the 
financial crisis; there is clearly not one objective account. Moreover, even within a 
single plot structure, such as the tragedy emplotment, there may be different sub-types 
available to the narrator. Fuld and Lehman Brothers, for example, could be emplotted 
along the King Lear tragedy, with the central-character-as-monster plot structure 
(Booker, 2005: 184-5). In this ‘dark’ version of the financial crisis, “The forces of 
darkness unleashed by Lear’s initial act of heartless folly had proved too powerful” 
(p.185). Fuld’s increasingly desperate phone calls, especially to the private home of 
the Bank of America CEO during the fateful Saturday (Sorkin, 2009: 306-7) are 
highly reminiscent of King Lear in the ‘Nightmare stage’, “with the poor, weak old 
man wandering through a stormy night on the desolate heath” until, eventually, he 
dies broken-hearted (Booker, 2004: 184). In the opposite emplotment, everyone was 
ravaged by a devastating plague/tsunami but the “senior executives stood as the 
delivering hero (..) performing heroic deeds in the epic mode.” (Gabriel, 2000: 118) 
The ‘surviving’ CEOs, such as Blankfein of Goldmann Sachs, or Dimon of JP 
MorganChase, are likely candidates for this kind of emplotment. In light of most 
banks being ‘saved’ in one form or another, some might even dare to give the tale a 
‘happy ending’ (Paulson, 2010; Brown, 2010).  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Our theoretical point of departure was the issue of how people account for and justify 
their actions using story-lines. We have sought to demonstrate the value of 
understanding the role of micro-linguistic practices, or ‘discursive devices’ (DDs) as 
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we call them, used in the construction of stories. We have used discursive devices 
analysis (DDA) to examine the moral stories constructed in the cross-examination of 
four senior executives of banks that received state support (‘bail-outs’) from the UK 
Treasury. Public hearings such as these could be viewed as nothing more than a 
symbolic ritual, designed to act as a public façade and make the Government appear 
to be ‘acting’ and “mitigate public anxieties” (Brown, 2005: 1579). We think that 
storytelling should not be read as simply ‘hot air’: the stories told by the bankers in 
our case had implications for who (or what) was assigned responsibility for the crisis 
and what should be done about it. These stories shaped both public opinion and policy 
responses. As HR-0010-0079 (this volume) also show, sensemaking is prospective as 
well as retrospective and therefore informs future actions (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 23) 
- even if stories only offer a plausible narrative rather than strict causality 
(Polkinghorne, 1988: 21).  
Our central contribution lies in showing how DDs are used as linguistic 
building blocks in the construction of moral stories. When a crisis of sensemaking 
occurs, and the dominant and well-established storyline (see HR-2010-0121, this 
issue) is no longer plausible. A new story must be crafted to make sense of what 
happened and why. The plot and characters of a story, we suggest, only start to form a 
meaningful story when these devices build up a moral landscape within which the 
events unfold. For example, stories often revolve around the creation of ‘villains’, 
‘heroes’, ‘victims’, ‘bystanders’ (guilty and innocent) and so on. These characters are 
far from ‘fixed’ and stable’ within the ongoing narration of conversations: 
protagonists may move from hero to villain to hero again, for instance (Whittle, 
Mueller & Mangan, 2009; see also HR-2010-0116, this issue).  
Our analysis also demonstrates the importance of an ‘ante-narrative’ (Boje, 
2001; 2008; 2010) lens, which means studying the collective, piecemeal and 
fragmented process of jointly narrating events. Bruner (1990: 160) described the 
contextual shift in discursive psychology such that coming to know anything should 
be seen as a situated and distributed, and therefore typically collective, 
accomplishment. “Storytelling is fundamentally interactive. Recipients and tellers 
work together to bring a story to the floor, to sustain it, and to end it, working out 
together what the story is ‘about’” (Mandelbaum, 1993: 253). We contribute to the 
study of ante-narrative by bringing insight into the discursive devices used when 
stories are contested, questioned or undermined by competing story-lines. The ‘lived 
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experience’ of storytelling, we suggest, can be ‘combative’ as well as ‘concertive’. 
Stories often have alternatives to contend with, some of which might be more 
coherent or convincing: “The crucial aspect, as always, is whose story will be 
accepted and become part of the general currency of explanation, whose version of 
events, whose account of the way things are?” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 62)  
We follow Edwards and Potter’s (1992: 54) argument that “accounts of past 
events need to be examined as pieces of discourse – as contextualised and variable 
productions that perform pragmatic and rhetorical work”, not as cognitive 
representations of memories or mental maps. Before the final ‘story’ of the financial 
crisis is established, multiple story-lines circulate, some gathering momentum and 
getting adopted or adapted, others losing credibility and falling by the wayside. Our 
analysis shows that the rhetorical skills of the narrator are crucial for dealing with 
competing story-lines. Discursive devices can enable storytellers to do two things: (a) 
establish the credibility and validity of their own story, and (b) discredit alternative 
versions of the story. Discursive devices analysis (DDA) also offers a unique 
contribution to the storytelling field by enabling us to understand how accounts are 
constructed to appear factual, not as a ‘mere story’ but rather “what really happened” 
(Edwards & Potter, 2005). In addition, DDA helps us to understand how supposedly 
‘factual’ accounts can be discredited by making them appear to be “just a story”, to be 
interpreted as self-serving, inaccurate or biased in certain ways (ibid). For example, 
the act of accusing a banker of presenting himself as a “victim” (see Extract 8) works 
to discredit the banker’s account by presenting it as ‘self-serving’ and ‘face-saving’. 
Thus, DDA departs from Gabriel’s (2000: 5) argument that “factual or descriptive 
accounts of events that aspire at objectivity rather than emotional effect must not be 
treated as stories”. In contrast, DDA is valuable precisely because it enables us to see 
how certain narratives are constructed to present themselves as an authentic, genuine, 
factual or objective version of events. People use discursive devices, we propose, 
“during the course of their talk to make their version of events appear ‘real’ or 
‘literal’” (Abell & Stokoe, 1999: 298). 
Periods of crisis, economic or otherwise, are of particular interest to studies of 
moral storytelling, because a crisis often intensifies processes of interpretation and 
sensemaking (i.e. ‘Why did the crisis happen? Who is to blame?). A ‘classic case’ 
would be the multiple attempts to ‘make sense’ of the Mann Gulch disaster (see 
Maclean, 1992; Weick, 1993). When things do not work out quite as expected, we 
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need to find some-thing or some-body to be held responsible (Mandelbaum, 1993: 
253). Actors are called upon to justify or excuse their own role (or lack thereof) in the 
crisis and thereby defend their own moral standing and reputation. However, we 
propose that moral storytelling is not exclusive to crisis sensemaking. Acts of moral 
positioning are routine events within organizations. Hence, we propose that DDA has 
the potential to illuminate other types of storytelling situations, particularly where 
moral accounting is involved. For example, Clarke, Brown and Hope-Hailey (2009) 
examine the moral stories told by managers to justify their actions and decisions. 
They also notice a tendency to appeal to external economic factors in justifying their 
decisions (for instance to downsize the business), enabling them to deflect blame and 
avoid moral accusations. DDA enables us to see this as a classic type of ‘externalizing 
device’ and thus contributes to storytelling analysis by providing a systematic 
catalogue of the kinds of linguistic tools through which moral stories are told.   
We view moral storytelling as an ongoing process rather than a one-off event, 
because stories are themselves accountable and may therefore be subject to a change 
in positioning (Harré, 1979/93: 138). The storylines we identified are ‘fragile stories’ 
(Sacks, 1992: 504-11): this means that they take potentially controversial moral 
positions about the events, which can be subject to rival emplotments. Take, for 
example, the argument that the crisis was not foreseen because “…we’re not smart 
enough as people. We just cannot see events that far in advance” (Greenspan cited in 
Ishikawa, 2009: 343). This account is susceptible to the counter-argument that both 
executives and policy-makers have themselves exhorted the need to generously pay 
for exceptional talent. Is the point of having exceptionally talented people at the helm 
not exactly that, namely to steer clear of deep crises? Our analysis shows how DDs 
are used by storytellers to resist or undermine opposing stories in this ongoing 
“discursive struggle” (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 1). As Czarniawska (2004: 9) observes, 
“there is no way of deciding between different stories except by negotiation”.  
This does not mean that all stories are equal. Some accounts have more 
convincing plots than others. As Polkinghorne (1988: 19) put it: “Not every plot can 
order a set of events. An appropriate configuration emerges only after a moving back 
and forth or tacking procedure compares proposed plot structures with the events and 
then revises the plot structure according to the principle of ‘best fit’”. Power is also at 
play in deciding which story is the story. In some cases, “other people or institutions 
sometimes concoct narratives for us, without including us in any conversation; this is 
  32 
what power is about” (Czarniawska, 1997: 14). But, as Czarniawska points out, “even 
as puppets in a power game, we are still co-authors of history, that other enacted 
dramatic narrative in which we are also actors” (Czarniawska, 1997: 14). Hence, there 
is an alternative to every ‘official’ story, including the official report into the Barings 
Bank collapse, for instance (Brown, 2005: 1588). Even in a single version of the story 
of the Enron collapse, the role of blame (and villain) was allotted to many parties: the 
US government, Enron executives, auditors, or sometimes all of them (Czarniawska, 
2004: 9).  
Our argument is that much can be gained for the study of sensemaking and 
storytelling from synthesising insights from an extensive body of work in Discursive 
Psychology, (ante-)narrative analysis, dramatism, rhetoric, ethnomethodology and 
Conversational Analysis. In Lynch and Bogen’s (1996) ethnomethodological analysis 
of the (in)famous case of Ollie North, in the Iran-Contra hearings, it was moral 
storytelling that enabled him to be transformed from someone who entered the 
hearings as the “person suspected of being the main instigator” into “the character 
who emerged [as] an American hero” (p. 102). It is worth noting that these authors, 
whilst rooted in ethnomethodology and CA, go beyond the situational in order to 
make a point about narratives and their broader impact. Likewise, in the case of our 
analysis, the protagonists (bankers) crafted a story in which they attempted to re-
position themselves as victims (in an overcoming-the-monster plot) rather than 
villains (in a tragedy plot). In so doing, the protagonists used discursive devices, 
including empathy, nominalisation and externalisation in order to construct a 
favourable character for themselves and reject the idea that they have behaved in 
morally questionable ways, such as being negligent, incompetent or arrogant
2
. The 
moral and dispositional qualities of the characters are therefore key to the unfolding of 
a plot: in the bankers’ telling of the story, they are strong but compassionate leaders, 
standing firm when faced by a once-in-a-lifetime event. They were also ‘innocent 
victims’ caught up in an event that was akin to a tsunami or a plague.  
Our DDA perspective also enables scholars within the DP and CA traditions to 
gain a deeper engagement with the story-telling literature by viewing DDs not as 
isolated, but as embedded in broader narrative constructions which tend to follow 
                                                 
2
 Our analysis makes no assertions about whether they behaved negligently or incompetently, or 
judgements about the truthfulness of their account.  
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classical emplotments. We suggest that future research can be directed towards 
identifying and mapping the stock of discursive devices that are used in narratives that 
span different institutional contexts. However, combining a DDA story-telling focus 
with narrative analysis (eg. Czarniawska, Polkinghorne, White) is not straightforward. 
Stokoe and Edwards (2006: 63) argue that for a DP-inspired analysis of stories, “We 
do not need a theory of narrative ... It is not so much that, in ordinary talk, we find 
fragments of ‘narratives’. Rather, it is that narratives and their analysis build upon the 
everyday kinds of accountability that are the pervasive concern of ordinary talk.” 
Hopefully, we have shown that discursive devices, which centrally incorporate the 
idea of pervasive accountability, can be analysed with regard to their role for 
overarching narrative structures.  
What difference does adopting a DDA approach to storytelling make? The 
contribution of DDA lies in its appreciation of discourse as social action. Viewing 
discourse as social action enables us to appreciate the performative aspects of 
storytelling: what the stories achieve or perform for those telling them. For the 
bankers, for instance, casting themselves as ‘victims’ enabled responsibility and 
blame to be (potentially) avoided. This is not simply about ‘saving face’, it is also 
about maintaining the legitimacy of the system that, to date, has also benefited them. 
For the politicians also, casting the bankers as ‘villains’ enables a convenient 
‘scapegoat’ to be found, individualising responsibility. The MPs were able to present 
themselves as ‘serving the public’ by locating and ‘punishing’ the perpetrators, while 
also avoiding any questions about the role of government in the crisis. Discursive 
devices, then, are not simply trivial matters of semantics - ‘mere rhetoric’ - but serve 
important political and ideological functions. Stories can of course generate greater 
understanding or even ‘enlightenment’ but, at the other extreme, they are also ways 
for manipulating an audience: “this makes stories particularly dangerous devices in 
the hands of image-makers, hoaxers, spin doctors, and fantasists” (Gabriel, 2004: 19). 
The ex US Treasury secretary, Paulson (2010: 348-9) argues that the “rhetoric to 
blame the U.S. government”, especially in the wake of Lehman's collapse, was “a 
simple, easy-to-understand story” which served the purposes of those who used it, 
such as Europe’s political leaders. The stories crafted by politicians, therefore, also 
served to legitimate particular actions (or inactions). For example, populist policies 
like the introduction of a “super-tax” on bankers’ bonuses in the UK make sense in 
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the context of the moral transgression-retribution plot constructed by the politicians: 
the bankers are the ‘wrong-doers’ and therefore must be ‘punished’.  
Storylines that individualise responsibility and attribute blame to a few ‘rogue’ 
individuals take the focus away from national and international failures in regulation 
and oversight. Public anger gets directed towards the individual. By individualising 
responsibility, the ideology of free-market capitalism remains largely unquestioned. 
The crisis is presented as a mere ‘blip’ in a normally smooth-running system, caused 
by a few ‘rogue’ individuals, and the “grand narrative” (Lyotard, 1979) of neo-
liberalism remains intact. As Stiglitz (2010: 6) observes, “bankers acted greedily 
because they had incentives and opportunities to do so, and that is what has to be 
changed”. Thus, while it may be natural to want to search for ‘culprits’, the problem 
with explanations based on the excessive greed of the bankers is that they fail to 
provide a basis for reform. To blame the ‘system’, on the other hand, diffuses and 
distributes moral responsibility away from individual bankers towards more general 
systemic failings, inviting the possibility of more widespread reform. A great deal 
certainly rests on which story, the politicians’ or the bankers’ emplotment, will 
eventually become embedded in our society’s “repertoire of legitimate stories” 
(Czarniawska, 1997: 16).   
 
Acknowledgments 
We are very grateful to the three reviewers and the guest editors for guiding us along 
the stages of the review process and helping us to turn this into what we believe is a 
much improved paper. All remaining errors are solely our responsibility.  
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, 
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
Author contact details 
Professor Andrea Whittle 
Cardiff Business School 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff CF10 3EU 
whittlea@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
Andrea Whittle is Professor of Organization Studies at Cardiff Business School, 
Cardiff University, UK, and a member of the Cardiff Organization Research Group 
(CORGies). Her research interests focus on the areas of discourse, identity and 
discursive psychology. Her research has been published in a range of journals 
  35 
including Organization Studies, Human Relations, Organization, Management 
Communication Quarterly, Journal of Organizational Change Management, New 
Technology, Work and Employment, and Journal of Applied Behavioural Science 
[Email: whittlea@cardiff.ac.uk] 
 
 
Professor Frank Mueller 
School of Management, 
University of St Andrews, 
The Gateway, North Haugh, 
St Andrews, KY16 9SS, Scotland, U.K., 
frankmueller100@yahoo.co.uk 
 
Frank Mueller (MA, Konstanz; MSc DPhil, Oxon) holds a Chair in Management at 
the University of St Andrews. His research interests include discourse analysis of 
workplace change; change in professional organizations, especially health and 
engineering; theory and practice of teamworking. He has published widely on these 
topics, including publications in Organization Studies, Human Relations, Journal of 
Management Studies, Accounting, Organization and Society, Organization and Work, 
Employment and Society. [Email: frankmueller100@yahoo.co.uk] 
 
  36 
References 
 
Abell J, Stokoe EH (1999). “I take full responsibility, I take some responsibility, I’ll 
take half of it but no more than that”: Princess Diana and the location of blame 
in the Panorama interview. Discourse Studies, 1 (3): 297-319.  
 
Antaki C (1998). Identity ascriptions in their time and place: 'Fagin'and 'the terminally 
dim'. In C. Antaki and S. Widdicombe (eds.) Identities in Talk. London: Sage, 
pp. 71-86 
 
Antaki C, and Horowitz A (2000). ‘Using Identity Ascription to Disqualify a Rival 
Version of Events as "Interested"’. Research on Language & Social Interaction, 
33(2): 155 – 177 
 
Antaki C, Wetherell, M (1999) Show concessions. Discourse Studies, 1(1): 7-27.  
 
Auburn T (2005) Narrative reflexivity as a repair device for discounting ‘cognitive 
distortions’ in sex offender treatment. Discourse and Society, 16(5): 697- 718. 
 
Bergmann JR (1998) Introduction: Morality in discourse. Research on Language and. 
Social Interaction, 31: 279-294  
 
Billig M (1996) Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology, 
2
nd
 edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Boje DM (2001) Narrative Methods for Organizational and Communication 
Research. London: Sage. 
 
Boje DM (2008) Storytelling Organizations. London: Sage 
 
Boje DM (2010) Storytelling and the Future of Organizations. London: Routledge. 
 
Booker C (2004) The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories. New York: Continuum. 
 
Brown AD (2005) Making sense of the collapse of Barings Bank. Human Relations, 
58(12): 1579-1604. 
 
Brown AD (2004) Authoritative sensemaking in a public inquiry report. Organization 
Studies, 25(1): 95-112. 
 
Brown AD (2000) Making sense of inquiry sensemaking. Journal of Management 
Studies, 37(1): 45-75. 
 
Brown AD, Humphreys M. (2003) ‘Epic and tragic tales: making sense of change’. 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 39(2): 121-144. 
 
Brown, G (2010). Beyond the Crash: Overcoming the First Crisis of Globalization. 
London: Simon & Schuster 
 
Bruner J (1990) Acts of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
  37 
 
Burke K (1969) A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Clarke C, Brown AD and Hope-Hailey V (2009) Working identities? Antagonistic 
discursive resources and managerial identity. Human Relations, 62(3): 323-352. 
 
Colville I, Pye A (2010) A sensemaking perspective on network pictures, Industrial 
Marketing Management 39(3): 372-380 
 
Cowan WD (2009) House of Cards: How Wall Street's Gamblers Broke Capitalism 
London: Allen Lane. 
  
CRESC (2009) An alternative report on UK banking reform: A public interest report 
from CRESC. Centre for Research on Socio Cultural Change, University of 
Manchester.  
 
Czarniawska B (2004) Narratives in Social Science Research. London: Sage. 
 
Czarniawska B (1999) Writing Management: Organization Theory as a Literary 
Genre. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Czarniawska B (1997) Narrating the Organization: Dramas of Institutional Identity. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Edwards D (1997) Discourse and Cognition. London: Sage.  
 
Edwards D, Potter J (1992) Discursive Psychology. London: Sage.  
 
Edwards D,  Potter J (2005) Discursive psychology, mental states and descriptions. In 
H.  Molder , J. Potter (Eds.), Talk and Cognition: Discourse, Mind and Social 
Interaction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.241-259 
 
Frye H.N (1957/71) Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
 
Gabriel Y (2000) Storytelling in Organizations, Facts, Fictions, and Fantasies. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Gabriel Y (2004) The narrative veil: Truth and untruths in storytelling. In Gabriel Y. 
(Ed.) Myths, Stories and Organizations: Premodern narratives for our times 17-
31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Gabriel Y (2004) Introduction. In Gabriel Y. (Ed.) Myths, Stories and Organizations: 
Premodern narratives for our times 1-9. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
   
Gergen KJ (1994) Reality and relationships: Soundings in social construction. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Harré R (1979/1993) Social Being. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
  38 
Harré R, Gillett G (1994) The Discursive Mind. Sage Publications Inc. Thousand 
Oaks, CA:Sage 
 
Harré R, van Langenhove L (1999) The Dynamics of Social Episodes, in Harre R, van 
Langenhove L (eds.) Positioning Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 1-13. 
 
Ishikawa T (2009) How I caused the Credit Crunch. London: Icon Books.  
 
Johnson S, Kwak J (2010) 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next 
Financial Meltdown. New York: Pantheon Books 
 
Lamont P (2007) Paranormal belief and the avowal of prior scepticism, Theory and 
Psychology, 17(5) 681–96. 
 
Lynch M and D Bogen (1996) The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text, and Memory at 
the lran-Contra Hearings. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Lyotard J-F (1979) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowedge. Translated by 
G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Maclean N (1992) Young Men and Fire. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago 
Press 
 
McDonald D (2010) Last Man Standing - The Ascent of Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan 
Chase. Simon & Schuster 
 
McDonald LG, Robinson P (2009) A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside 
Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers. New York: Crown Business Press.  
 
Mills CW (1940) Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive. American 
Sociological Review, 5(6) 904-913 
 
Mandelbaum J (1993). Assigning responsibility in conversational storytelling: The 
interactional construction of reality. Text, 13(2), 247-266 
 
Mueller, F and Whittle, A (2011) Translating Management Ideas: A Discursive 
Devices Analysis. Organization Studies 32(1): 67-84 
 
Mulholland J (1994) Handbook of persuasive tactics: A practical language guide. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Ochs E (1997) Narrative. In T. van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse as structure and process 
(pp. 185-207). London: Sage 
 
Paulson H (2010) On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global 
Financial System. New York: Hachette Book Group.  
 
Polkinghorne DE (1988) Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences. Albany, N.Y.: 
State University of New York Press 
 
  39 
Pomerantz A (1978) Compliment responses: Notes on the cooperation of multiple 
constraints, in J. Schenkein, (ed.) Studies in the organization of conversational 
interaction. New York: Academic Press: 79-112.  
 
Potter J (1996) Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. 
London: Sage.  
 
Potter J, te Molder H (2005) Talking cognition: Mapping and making the terrain. In: 
H. te Molder, J. Potter (Eds.), Conversation and Cognition (pp.1-54). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Potter, J, Stringer, P and Wetherell, M (1984).  Social Texts and Context: Literature 
and Social Psychology.  London; Routledge. 
 
Potter J, Wetherell M (2005) Postscript to Chinese edition of Discourse and Social 
Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. Loughborough: Loughborough 
University (pdf file) 
 
Sacks H (1992) Lectures on Conversation, 2 vols, edited by G. Jefferson, with 
Introductions by Emanuel A. Schegloff. Oxford: Blackwell  
 
Sneijder P, te Molder H (2005) Moral logic and logical morality: attributions of 
responsibility and blame in online discourse on veganism. Discourse and 
Society, 16(5): 675-696. 
 
Sorkin AR (2009) Too Big To Fail: Inside the Battle to Save Wall Street. London: 
Allen Lane. 
 
Speer SA,, Potter J (2002) Judith Butler, discursive psychology, and the politics of 
conversation.  In McIlvenny, P. (Ed.). Talking gender and sexuality (pp. 151-
180).  Amsterdam; John Benjamins 
 
Stiglitz J (2010) Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy. 
London: Allen Lane. 
 
Stokoe E, Edwards D (2006) Story formulations in talk-in-interaction. Narrative 
Inquiry, 16(1): 59-68.  
 
Tibman J (2009) The Murder of Lehman Brothers: An Insider's Handbook to the 
Global Meltdown New York: Brick Tower Books; 1st edition. 
 
van Dijk TA (1997) Discourse as Structure and Process: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction: v. 1. London: SAGE Publications 
 
van Langenhove L, Harré R (1999) Introducing Positioning Theory in Harre R, van 
Langenhove L (eds.) Positioning Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 14-31. 
 
Ward V (2010) The Devil's Casino: Friendship, Betrayal and the High Stakes Game 
Played Inside Lehman Brothers. London: Wiley. 
 
  40 
Watson, T.J. (1995) Rhetoric, Discourse and Argument in Organisational Sense-
Making: A Reflexive Tale, Organization Studies, Vol.16 (5), pp.805-821 
 
Watson T (2009) Narrative, life story and manager identity: A case study in 
autobiographical identity work. Human Relations 62(3): 425-452. 
 
Weick K (1993) The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch 
Disaster, Administrative Science Quarterly 38: 628-652 
 
Weick K (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations. London: Sage. 
 
Weick K (2001) Making sense of the organization. Malden, MA: Blackwell.  
 
Weider D (1974) Language and social reality: the case of telling the convict code. 
The Hague: Mouton. 
 
Wetherell M, Potter J (1992) Mapping the Language of Racism. Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
 
White H (1978): Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Whittle, A and Mueller, F (2011) The Language of Interests: The Contribution of 
Discursive Psychology. Human Relations 64(3): 415-435.  
Whittle, A., Mueller, F. & Mangan, A. (2009) ‘Storytelling and ‘Character’: Victims, 
villains and heroes in a case of technological change’, Organization, 16(3): 425-
442. 
 
 
